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Abstract
How are we to distinguish between appropriate emotional responses that 
reveal morally salient reasons and inappropriate emotional responses that 
reflect our prejudices? It is often assumed that reason – considered as distinct 
from emotion – will make the distinction. I argue that this view is false, and 
that the process by which emotional responses are vetted involves ‘emotional 
self-awareness’. By this, I mean feeling an emotion, being aware of so doing, 
and feeling some usually subtle emotional response, often of calm or anxiety, 
to it, together with a general readiness to feel and acknowledge what emotions 
one has. Registering and exploring feelings of anxiety that arise in emotional 
self-awareness helps enable us to detect when emotions and thoughts are 
inappropriate. Deliberation that is not emotionally open in this way is 
therefore at an epistemic disadvantage. Furthermore, the attempt to remain 
unemotional when evaluating one’s emotions can be produced or co-opted by 
anxiety about one’s feelings of precisely the kind that indicates one’s 
emotional responses and thoughts are being distorted.
There is currently considerable interest in the importance of the emotions to making 
good ethical decisions. Taking as given the view that emotions are evaluative 
responses,1 how are we to distinguish between ‘appropriate’ emotional responses that 
guide us towards what is of real value, towards genuinely morally salient reasons for 
2action, and ‘inappropriate’ emotional responses that reflect our prejudices and hang-
ups? The idea that an emotion is not self-justifying is uncontentious, but it is often 
assumed that reason – considered as distinct from emotion – will provide the 
justification. I shall call this position ‘intellectualism’.
One can find examples of influential philosophers who find no essential place 
for emotion in ethical deliberation almost across the ethical board. The exception is 
virtue ethics, which commonly brings reason and emotion closer together than other 
theories. Contemporary utilitarianism has developed a sophisticated division between 
justification and deliberation, and some forms, such as character utilitarianism, advise 
us not to consider outcomes in a utilitarian fashion when deliberating on right action, 
since this is likely to lead to a less than optimal result. Nevertheless, utilitarian 
calculation is still frequently used as a decision procedure in many philosophical 
examples in works in both theoretical and practical ethics. Utilitarian calculation is 
usually represented as a method of reasoning with facts, with emotions either 
explicitly denigrated, or not mentioned. J J C Smart, R M Hare, and Peter Singer, for 
instance, all argue in this vein.2 Kantians, on the other hand, have had little to say on 
the possible role of emotion in deliberation and the discernment of duty.3 The decisive 
step of applying the test of the Categorical Imperative is supposedly purely rational, 
though Kantians may grant that awareness of one’s emotions may be important for 
knowing one’s maxim, which is central to applying the test correctly.4 Intellectualism 
is also found elsewhere, for example, in works by Jonathan Dancy and Thomas 
Nagel.5
If we accept the view that emotions can track and reveal values and morally 
salient reasons for action, then some of the views described above are already in 
trouble for discarding an important source of evaluative information. This argument 
3has been made, largely by virtue theorists, and I do not intend to discuss it further. In 
any case, the point may easily be incorporated by maintaining that reason should 
attend to, evaluate, and then process or discard the evaluation embodied in the 
emotion, and continue with its non-emotional deliberation. But how is it that we 
evaluate the reliability and validity of our emotions? I shall argue that emotion is 
essentially involved in this process of discovering which emotions are ‘appropriate’. 
If I am right, the problems facing these views, and others similar to them, is far more 
serious.
In §§ I-III I argue that the process by which emotional responses are vetted 
involves further kinds of emotional input. In §§ IV-V, I respond to objections, 
including the objection that emotions can be destructive of deliberation, and that they 
therefore need to be set aside or suppressed for us to remain ‘clear-headed’. However, 
it is worth saying now that I am not claiming that deliberation is a matter of being 
swayed by and following emotions wherever they take us; nor is the state of 
emotional self-awareness that I recommend intended as a kind of substitute for 
rational thought. My claim is that rational thought is dangerously incomplete without 
certain types of emotional input. Furthermore, emotional self-awareness should not be 
taken as equivalent to ‘being emotional’ (a state that can involve very little self-
awareness of any kind); which of course means that I deny that the only alternative to 
‘being emotional’ is being unemotional. 
I shall restrict my discussion to deliberation as coming to an ethical judgment 
about what to do, which I believe is at the core of moral thought, for morality is first 
and foremost practical. This involves making ethical judgments about the rightness 
and wrongness about possible states of affairs, actions, etc. If we are not to be 
hypocritical, our judgments of right and wrong in general should reflect those related 
4to our own particular case. In the first instance, the question we each face is ‘what it is 
right for me to do?’ – deliberation is first-personal.
I. Emotional self-awareness
If we are to evaluate our emotions during deliberation in the attempt to discover 
whether they are insightful or misleading, awareness of our emotions is clearly 
important, for we may feel an emotion without taking note of the fact. One form of 
self-consciousness about one’s emotions is the awareness that one is experiencing an 
emotion, a conscious registering of the fact of experiencing an emotion. This 
awareness is not itself affectively tinged, and it is compatible with not really feeling
the emotion. Thinking of one’s emotions as facts about oneself could be one way of 
considering emotions in deliberation. As the emotions themselves do not enter into 
deliberation except as ‘facts’, it is a form of representation which non-emotional 
reason might use when evaluating emotions.
There is a second form of self-consciousness of one’s emotions which I shall 
call emotional self-awareness. Emotional self-awareness involves three things: feeling
the emotion, being aware of so doing, and, normally, feeling some ‘second-order’ 
emotional response to it (the response is ‘second-order’ in that it is a response to the 
emotion). To these three, we may add a dispositional fourth: an openness to emotions, 
a readiness to feel and acknowledge what emotions one has.
The second-order feelings involved in emotional self-awareness are often very 
subtle, and frequently lie along an axis of psychological tension and calm. I may 
identify with the emotion and feel sure of it, or feel vaguely uncomfortable, guilty, 
shameful, or perhaps defensive about it. These feelings of tension, discomfort, anxiety 
5or of calm and psychological integrity are distinct from the positive or negative 
feelings of the emotion that forms the object of self-awareness. I would say we have 
these second-order feelings in any case, but often fail to identify them; in emotional 
self-awareness, we can become conscious of them.
I shall argue that emotional self-awareness, not simple ‘self-representation’ –
reducing emotions to facts about ourselves –  is essential to good deliberation. This 
response of comfort or discomfort, either immediately or upon reflection, to a first-
order emotion can help inform our evaluations of whether the emotion reveals or 
distorts the value of its object to us. But I shall first describe the phenomenology more 
closely to identify just what it is I believe can help in this way.
People can be less or more aware of what it is they feel. Let us take the case of 
a man who inappropriately feels resentment towards someone else, a; in fact, he feels 
resentment because he feels impotent when around a. If he is at least aware of feeling 
resentful, there are (at least) six states he could find himself in, depending on how 
self-aware he is:
1. he feels resentment, tinged with anxiety, towards a, but he is not aware that he 
is feeling anxious in his resentment; however, there is something-it-is-like to 
experience resentment tinged with anxiety, and his resentment will come 
across to an acute observer as that of an anxious man;
2. he registers the anxiety overlaying or incorporated in the resentment, but he is 
uncertain about this identification, and fails to understand the anxiety or its 
significance; 
3. he succeeds in distinguishing anxiety from the resentment, but does not know 
why he is anxious; he just feels both resentful and anxious;
64. he understands that he is anxious, in some way, about feeling resentful, or 
more accurately, anxious in connection with his resentment; 
5. he understands the source of his anxiety, relating it to his fear of impotence; if 
he achieves this, he will also understand his resentment as being related to the 
same;
6. he is able to acknowledge and integrate his fear of impotence into himself, 
which lessens the fear to an extent; his resentment towards a, should he still 
feel it, dissipates whenever it arises.
There is one stage that precedes (1) above, in which resentment is not felt, because the 
response to the fear of impotence takes the primitive form of a bodily symptom. In 
such somaticization, 
0. the man he does not feel any particular emotion consciously at all, but 
whenever he is around a, he feels nauseous.
This example shows how, if we are aware of feeling anxious in relation to an emotion, 
we may gain insight into the source of that emotion. But this is a complex matter. I 
am not claiming, for example, that if one feels discomfort regarding an emotion, this 
automatically means that it is inappropriate or that it misrepresents its object. 
Discomfort can be caused by an appropriate, revelatory emotion clashing with my 
self-image. In either case, though, noticing it is the route into unravelling the emotion 
and the grounds for the discomfort that accompanies it. In this way, by better 
understanding the source of our emotions, we may also come to understand the 
evaluations they contain as misleading or insightful.
7Emotional self-awareness can extend beyond our emotions, to take other 
mental states and processes as its object. For instance, it can also take the process of
deliberation as its object. As deliberation proceeds, it will be marked by emotional 
responses to the possible options considered, to the thoughts entertained, to the 
manner or style of the deliberation itself. And these emotional responses will be, or be
marked by, similar feelings of tension or its opposite. The deliberation may seem to 
have become stale, or waspish, or missing the point, or unduly technical, or defensive; 
or it may feel true, important, expressive, involving, and so on. These emotional 
responses to the process of deliberation are a part of that process, a feedback 
mechanism that can help guide the course it takes. In this way, emotional responses 
are involved in the evaluation of deliberation, an evaluation that is important for how 
insightful that deliberation is.
It is clear that insightful self-awareness is of help to deliberation. But need it 
take the affective form I have described? To better answer this question, I shall first 
expand on some psychological operations that can influence what we feel, and present 
the argument that emotional self-awareness is necessary for good deliberation in § III.
II. Defence Mechanisms and Emotional Self-Awareness
Our emotional responses often do not reveal reasons for acting, but are projections of 
difficulties within ourselves. Some rather simplified examples: homophobics, 
projecting their own homosexual feelings into homosexuals, respond to homosexuals 
as though they are a threat, e.g. to the moral fabric of society, while the ‘threat’, 
which is to the homophobic’s ego-ideal, in fact arises from within the homophobic. 
Similar issues are at stake in any division of the world into an evil ‘them’ and a 
8righteous ‘us’, such as the Nazis’ view of the Jews. A different example: someone not 
given a promotion, simply because he was not the best person for the job, may feel 
resentful of his boss, but come to believe his boss resents or hates him (this neatly 
provides a rationalization for his lack of promotion, as the worker refuses to recognise 
his unsuitability for the post). Or again, after a difficult break-up, a man may deny –
to himself as well as others – that he feels angry or bitter, or indeed that he ever loved 
the woman he was with. He may not be aware of feeling these feelings.
According to contemporary psychoanalytic theory, these cases are united in 
two ways. First, they make use of psychological processes that can be useful in other 
circumstances. For instance, the suppression of feeling involved in the last case can be 
useful when performing emotionally difficult tasks, such as autopsies. Or again, the 
projection of our own (good) traits into others can form part of the build-up of trust in 
healthy relationships; taken to an extreme, it might lead to a less healthy, but still 
productive, creation of an artistic muse who inspires our creativity. Second, in each 
case, the processes are used to defend the subject against a painful reality by 
perverting his or her experience of that reality. When used to this end, we may call the 
processes ‘defence mechanisms’.
Defence mechanisms are activated by painful or unacceptable emotions and 
desires and seek to prevent them from reaching consciousness.6 They make use of 
mental processes that, using the imagination, operate ‘on mental content that 
represents the cause of anxiety in such a way as to reduce or eliminate anxiety’.7 (In 
fact, the processes may operate in relation to any of several painful feelings, including 
shame and guilt, but I shall focus on anxiety.) This reduction of anxiety is, in such 
cases, the processes’ ‘psychic function’,8 i.e. they occur precisely because they are 
causally efficacious, via their operations on mental content, in reducing anxiety. As 
9already noted, the processes involved can be useful, but can also be co-opted 
defensively, i.e. in the attempt to avoid confrontation with reality. They change not 
only what we feel, but also what and how we think about the people or situations 
involved. The three examples given involve the defence mechanisms of projective 
identification, in which traits or ‘parts’ of the self are imaginatively projected into 
others; reversal, in which the subject and object of an emotion are switched around; 
and isolation, which strips away and represses the personal and emotional significance 
of an event. There are others.9
The anxiety that indicates the operation of defence mechanisms can, with 
difficulty, sensitivity, and practice, be introspectible in emotional self-awareness, 
registering as the feelings of tension and discomfort described above. We can, with 
self-knowledge, ‘catch ourselves’, but this self-awareness is not easy to achieve. 
The relationship between the emotion that is felt and the anxiety can vary from 
case to case. Here are some illustrative examples:
1. the anxiety and emotion are the conscious manifestation is of an unconscious 
emotion that is being defended against. Changing our earlier example slightly, 
our resentful man is resentful around a, who has achieved what he hasn’t, 
because he is resentful of his parents, whom he blames for his lack of success. 
His anxiety, here, could indicate either the pain of this insight were he to 
realize why he is resentful, or his fear of taking responsibility for his life.
2. the anxiety is a conscious manifestation of the unconscious anxiety that 
instigated the defence mechanism, caused by a different unconscious emotion, 
while the conscious emotion is a product of the defence. The case of 
homophobia described above could exemplify this: the anxiety is the 
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manifestation of the unconscious fear of one’s own homosexual desire, while 
the aggressive rage is the result of projecting the object of fear into 
homosexuals.
3. the anxiety is that of realizing something truthful about oneself that does not 
live up to one’s ideals. For example, my anger may make me feel anxious 
because I cannot accept that I care so much about the object of my anger. In 
this case, I might seek to represent my anger as devoid of reason, perhaps 
simply the product of a mood. 
4. the anxiety is that of being cut off from one’s emotions, for instance, if one 
fails to feel anything at all in a situation of personal significance.
What all these cases have in common is that an emotional experience is marked with 
anxiety (or other difficult, second-order emotions). In many of them, the emotion felt 
seeks to conceal the anxiety. And in each of them, if the subject is emotionally self-
aware, he or she may be able to detect the anxiety that their emotional response, or 
absence of emotion, can conceal.
Since anxiety of this kind typically indicates the operation of defence 
mechanisms, exploring it together with the emotions we feel can enable insight into 
the sources of our emotions. Emotional self-awareness, which does not simply 
register the fact that we feel the emotion but also enables us to detect our anxiety 
about feeling the emotion, alerts us to the possibility of defensive responses. And this 
is clearly important for good deliberation; consider the resentful worker deliberating 
about whether to take another job, or the homophobe considering how to respond to 
the news that his son is homosexual. Emotions that are the product of defence 
mechanisms are not appropriate evaluative responses to the world. Emotional self-
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awareness enables us to detect our anxiety which raises the possibility that our 
emotional response to the situation is being driven by defence mechanisms. Focusing 
attention on the emotion threatens to expose its defensive nature: Is it concealing 
something? In other cases, in which an emotion challenges our self-image, the 
defensive response is to discount the significance of the emotion, which may be an 
appropriate evaluative response. Here, emotional self-awareness forewarns us of the 
possibility of defence mechanisms operating in how we respond to this painful truth 
(for instance, ignoring it, denying it, isolating it, projecting it, etc.). In each case, 
unless we realise the nature of our feelings, we may not judge or decide well.
Of course, non-emotional self-awareness of the kind intellectualism advocates 
may also enquire into the sources of our emotions. Why isn’t this enough? 
III. Insight and Intellectualization
The main point of the last section is that without being alive to the feelings of anxiety 
and calm that characterize the presence or absence of defence mechanisms, our 
enquiry into the sources of our emotions loses a vital source of information. Being 
emotionally self-aware when we evaluate an emotion provides us with information 
which, at the very least, we would find much more difficult to access if we do not 
respond affectively. The following example illustrates this, as well as the need to be 
willing to question our emotions sensitively:
Let us assume that a wife is deeply disturbed at learning that her husband has had a 
transient affair with another woman. Even months later she cannot get over it, although she 
knows it is a matter of the past and although the husband does everything to re-establish a good 
relationship. She makes herself and him miserable, and now and then goes on a spree of bitter 
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reproaches against him. There are a number of reasons that might explain why she feels and 
acts in this way, quite apart from a genuine hurt about the breach of confidence. It may have 
hurt her pride that the husband could be attached to anyone but herself. It may be intolerable to 
her that the husband could slip out from her control and domination. The incident may have 
touched off a dread of desertion . . . She may be discontented with the marriage for reasons of 
which she is not aware, and she may use this conspicuous occurrence as an excuse for 
expressing all her repressed grievances . . . She may have felt attracted toward another man and 
resent the fact that her husband indulged in a freedom that she had not allowed herself. If she 
examined such possibilities she might not only improve the situation considerably but also gain 
a much clearer knowledge of herself.10
If she did ‘examine such possibilities’, how could the woman decide between them? 
She might try to ‘figure it out’, but she may come to decide her anger is a matter of 
hurt pride when in fact it is dread of desertion. It seems that until the woman can feel
the feelings the different hypotheses suggest, they lack confirmation, and any 
hypothesis will remain a hypothesis. The woman needs the willingness to feel and 
acknowledge whatever her emotions actually are. If there is another way of judging 
which explanation correctly identifies the source of her anger, it will certainly be 
more convoluted, interpretative, and open to doubt. So we may conclude that reason 
that is not informed and qualified by emotional self-awareness will not have the 
means to know of its ‘insights’ that they are insights – it cannot confirm their truth.
The complexity and subtlety of the sources of our emotions is obvious. Put 
simply, however, we need to know, in our evaluation of our emotions, whether an 
emotion is the product of a defence mechanism, and if so, what that defence 
mechanism is seeking to hide. To know which of several possible explanations we 
come up with is true, we need to engage openly with the thoughts and feelings we 
have. We must be prepared to actually feel; and if we are, then we shall feel whatever 
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emotional responses (if any) we have, and emotions enter into our deliberation. For 
emotional self-awareness, we must add to this openness a willingness to reflect upon 
our emotions, to feel and explore our further ‘second-order’ responses to our 
emotions.
To all this, we may add the case against non-emotional self-awareness. The 
absence of any affective response when evaluating one’s emotions suggests that 
something is awry. Without feeling both one’s emotions and one’s responses to one’s 
emotions, it is highly questionable whether one is genuinely open to one’s emotions. 
Not to engage with one’s emotions emotionally suggests an unwillingness to fully
engage with the emotions in the first place. This unwillingness requires explanation. 
One likely answer, based on what has been said above, is that one is trying to avoid 
feeling anxiety. Avoiding the affective force of one’s emotions and one’s second-
order responses to them is a tactic of the defence mechanism of intellectualization. So 
the absence of emotional self-awareness, precisely when one is attempting to 
understand and evaluate one’s emotions, is indicative of a psychological defence.
Intellectualization defends against anxiety partly by working with denial, 
isolation, or repression to simply not feel the emotion that arouses anxiety, and partly 
by using various means of avoiding the emotion’s implications and personal 
significance.11 It can defend against the feelings themselves or against recognizing the 
importance of whatever the feeling is a response to. For instance, it may defend 
against the anger I feel because this would bring to mind the injury that was done to 
me, and it is the injury, rather than the anger per se, that arouses pain or anxiety.
One particularly relevant way intellectualization can work is by shifting 
attention from the external stimulus that arouses feeling to thought processes 
themselves, using self-observation as a defence. The focus of attention onto thought 
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acts to suppress feeling. Emotions are replaced by the second-order non-emotional 
registering of ‘the fact that I feel x’. In place of the emotion is the intellectual, and 
isolated, ‘fact’ of the emotion (if the subject admits at all that they feel something). 
The value and personal significance registered directly by the emotion as an 
evaluative response to its object are no longer directly registered. In their place is a 
fact of psychology. The move strips the emotion of its feeling, so it is no longer felt. 
The move from feeling to non-emotional representation of the emotion is a defence 
against discomforting feeling and/or realizing something of significance.
So I claim that the substitution of the fact that one has a certain emotion for 
the emotion itself, a move central to non-emotional self-awareness, is evidence for the 
operation of a defence mechanism. And this is why a non-emotional self-awareness 
should be viewed with suspicion. Not feeling any emotion does not mean one’s 
thinking is undistorted. Assessing one’s emotions non-emotionally suggests an 
anxiety about feeling the emotions one is assessing and/or about what such feelings 
could reveal (either about the situation or oneself). Obviously, the reasons for this 
anxiety could prove very important for the results of deliberation.
The case against intellectualism, then, is this: Intellectualism advocates 
suppressing emotion during deliberation, and if emotion is to be evaluated, then it 
must advocate replacing emotion in thought by ‘the fact that I feel x’ in order for that 
evaluation to be conducted non-emotionally. Furthermore, if we substitute non-
emotional self-awareness for emotional self-awareness, even if this is not a product of 
a defence mechanism, our evaluation of our emotions is more likely to be influenced
by defence mechanisms – first, because it deprives us of a vital means of detecting the 
operation of defence mechanisms; and second, because the emotionless state of mind
is subjectively indistinguishable from one that is produced by a defence mechanism. 
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How can such deliberation avoid being co-opted by intellectualization, or tell if it is 
co-opted, if it is not already a reflection of it?
IV. Objections
I shall consider four responses from the intellectualist. The most obvious, the fact that 
emotions can distort and disrupt our thinking, I shall deal with in the next section. 
So, second, the intellectualist may protest that surely there are occasions when 
we simply do not have these further second-order responses of tension or calm. Even 
if this is true, it does not help intellectualism’s cause. Unless one is highly aware of 
one’s emotions, and this involves being open to the emotions that one does have, one 
cannot distinguish between being emotion-free and simply repressing or 
intellectualizing one’s emotions.
Third, I have said that our experiences and interpretations of anxiety are not 
transparent or incorrigible. If I experience the positive feelings of emotional self-
awareness, this is evidence for the absence of distortion in emotional response. But 
emotions that are genuinely responsive to values are not self-validating; nor do these 
experiences of feeling certain emotions without anxiety prove one right (not least
because our ego-ideals can themselves be products of defence). So, it seems, it may 
be objected that emotional self-awareness is not going to make the decisions we reach 
any more secure or morally right.
This misses the point, which is that emotional self-awareness is central to 
good deliberation, which is first-personal. It cannot substitute for reasoned thought, 
but our experiences of anxiety and calm are, I have argued, of epistemological benefit. 
The best we can do as individuals, regarding getting value judgments right, is to bring 
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reason together with emotions that feel genuinely appropriate and self-expressive, and 
bring these together with self-knowledge, which may identify further causes in our 
psychology that may account for some of these emotions. In any of this we may fail, 
but insofar as we succeed, those emotions that survive as genuine embody our view of 
things, the values we are ready to stand by.
Finally, what can I say of subjects, who taking on board all the points above 
about emotional self-awareness, conduct their deliberation in two stages: first, they 
are emotionally self-aware, noting the personal significance of their emotions and 
their propensity towards certain distorting defensive thoughts and feelings; then, for 
deliberation, they become non-emotional – ‘cool’ and ‘clear-headed’, to prevent 
emotions from influencing the course of the deliberation, while taking into account all 
that they have discovered during emotional self-awareness?12 Wouldn’t this 
ultimately vindicate intellectualism?
It would not, for during the process of deliberation, further feelings can arise 
providing more of the kind of information provided by emotional self-awareness in 
the first place. Even while attempting to bear one’s feelings and propensities for 
distortion in mind as a list of facts about oneself, deliberation can go astray, and these 
propensities can operate unconsciously. Deliberation can still start to miss the point, 
and our thoughts can become distorted or unnecessarily technical; defence 
mechanisms can still operate even when we know they are likely to. The best we can 
hope for is to develop the ability to pick up when we become defensive. And if this 
occurs, deliberation which is emotionally disengaged will be less likely to pick it up. 
But if we are open to the feelings that indicate this, we have a better chance of 
catching ourselves. This is why deliberation that operates with just facts, even facts 
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originally provided by emotional self-awareness, rather than engaging with the 
emotional dynamics of the self at the time, is fundamentally flawed.
Unless deliberation is constantly open to the feelings that arise during the 
process of reflection, it runs a greater risk of leaving unconscious influences on 
deliberation uncovered and unexplored. We cannot first evaluate our emotions in 
emotional self-awareness, and then close ourselves to feelings in order to evaluate 
them by ‘non-emotional’ reason. The process of evaluating our emotions involves 
both reason and emotional self-awareness, not sequentially, but together. Reason here 
is not emotionally cold. In order to evaluate our emotions reliably, we need to draw 
on the resources of emotional self-awareness.
What would be the temptation to adopt a two-stage strategy, anyway? Only a 
continued commitment to the idea that emotional thought is less reliable than 
unemotional thought – which I hope to have disproved by the discussion of 
intellectualization; or the concern that emotions have a propensity to be disruptive, a 
topic with which I shall end.
V. Disruptive emotions
Intellectualism is at one with common-sense in holding that an emotion that seems to 
muddy the waters, to impede clear deliberation, to be unhelpful, to distort what we 
think, needs to be laid to one side so that deliberation can continue more rationally 
and productively. It is not impossible that this should be the right approach in some 
cases, for emotions can be genuinely destructive of deliberation. But cases differ, and 
we should note that to come to this conclusion one first needs to explore and 
understand the emotion, rather than lay it aside immediately.
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Repressing, ignoring, or disowning emotions that disrupt or distort thought 
does little to constructively engage with the mental states that underlie them and are 
likely to remain psychologically active even if the emotion is suppressed. Why it is 
that I feel this way is not altered by ignoring the feeling, and these grounds will 
continue to influence how I think in ways I may not recognise, something 
intellectualism fundamentally fails to recognise.
So there are two ways in which we may respond to and cope with a disruptive 
emotion. We may approach it either as an object of explanation, to be taken account 
of as a possible (and possibly illicit) influence on deliberation; or in the spirit of self-
understanding. The first approach is in line with the replacement of an emotion by a 
fact of psychology. Objectifying an emotion is one way of psychologically disowning 
it, of being unprepared to grant it personal significance. And deliberating in ignorance 
of the personal meaning of the issue about which one deliberates is clearly 
unsatisfactory. The significance of the disruptive or distorting emotion is best 
incorporated into the process of deliberation. If my deliberation is shaped by
significances I do not understand, the patterns my decisions take will not in fact match 
a plan of the good life as I understand it, even if I rationalize each decision as it 
happens. For I have not understood the significance of the situations that face me or 
the grounds of my ‘choices’, even if I deceive myself into believing that I have.
More productively, we can adopt a spirit of self-understanding. What needs to 
be taken into account is my feeling this emotion. It is I who stand in need of 
explanation. After all, the emotion has come up in connection with a topic of some 
importance to me, since I am deliberating about it. I should be willing to attach 
personal meaning to the anomalous emotion. On this second approach, the first step is 
to engage with the emotion in emotional self-awareness as far as possible, feeling 
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both the emotion and my responses to it and approaching it as part of myself. Doing 
so will increase my insight regarding the topic that aroused the emotion, revealing 
some significance that has hitherto remained unconscious.
But what of emotions that are felt too strongly for deliberation to proceed? 
Once we have understood the emotion as far as possible, it would seem that we must 
set it aside; and this is true at times. We can, if we need to, put the emotion aside, 
which may involve deliberately curbing the strength of the feeling so that thought can 
proceed more clearly. But the need to set aside or suppress an emotion completely 
may be rarer than the intellectualist is prone to imagine. For emotional self-awareness 
does not require that the emotion must be felt with its full force, but that it must be 
felt; that is to say, it must be represented in thought with an emotional sensitivity that 
re-presents and engages with its affect, not one that attempts to strip its affect from it. 
However, the emotional openness of emotional self-awareness can be detached, in 
that the emotion felt does not overwhelm the subject, but is moderated sufficiently to 
be questioned and understood, while still being engaged, for the emotion continues to 
be felt. (This applies both to the exploration of the significance of the feeling and the 
continuation of deliberation, for a powerful emotion can prevent both its own 
exploration and further thought, as the case of the angry woman in § III illustrated.)
This point regarding ‘detached engagement’ is central to a correct 
understanding of the claims of emotional self-awareness. The idea of feeling an 
emotion in this way is familiar from aesthetics. Wordsworth, for instance, claimed 
that poetry ‘takes its origin from emotion recollected in tranquillity’13 which involves 
the poet feeling once more the emotion felt originally, though in a weaker form. What 
I am claiming is analogous. If an emotion is not distracting from deliberative thought, 
it can continue to be felt during reflection; if its affect impedes reflection, then it can 
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be moderated by a detached-yet-engaged empathetic sensitivity to it; if it cannot be 
moderated, then of course, it must be set aside during deliberation or deliberation is 
not possible until the power of the feeling has passed a little. In being detached, and 
moderating the force of the emotion, it is important that there is no attempt to deny 
the personal significance of the feeling in any way. When we must moderate an 
emotion for deliberation to be proceed, it is only emotional self-awareness that 
accepts the emotion for what it is and learns from it.
Whether our emotion is appropriate or inappropriate, disruptive or not, the 
awareness of the existence, status, and nature of our emotions needs to be an 
emotionally responsive awareness. And so the evaluation of our emotions will involve 
second-order emotional responses. So intellectualism’s claim that reason can and 
should autonomously and independently evaluate our emotional responses to 
situations is false.14
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